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Notes
Listeners' Rights Providing a State Action Theory in
the "Company Town" Analogues
Perhaps no constitutional right is more firmly entrenched in our
national ethos than that of "free speech." It guards not only the
right of self-expression, but also the larger societal interest in the
discussion and development of sound and popularly supported na-
tional policies.' Yet, despite the continuing efforts of the courts and
legislatures to protect first amendment freedoms, a number of pri-
vately controlled economic institutions have emerged in recent
years which have acted independently to limit the scope of free
speech. The migrant labor camp and the suburban shopping mall
are two examples of such private enclaves. When their owners pro-
hibit on-the-plremises dissemination of information, this may yield
a narrowing of the first amendment liberties of labor camp residents
and shopping mall customers because constitutional guarantees
apply only against governmental restraints, 2 and not against re-
straints imposed by private parties.
The Supreme Court first confronted such a constraint resulting
from a privately controlled economic institution in the mid-1940's
in a case involving a "company town." The company towns of that
era differed from "normal" municipalities only in that the first
amendment rights typically germane to the public, such as rights
to assemble, picket or speak in public areas, might be legally re-
stricted by the private town owner. In Marsh v. Alabama,I however,
the Court enforced the first amendment rights of a company town's
residents against a private owner, finding the required state action
in that the private owner had assumed a public function, the owner-
ship and maintenance of a town, to a degree sufficient to trigger the
assertion of the residents' constitutional rights against the com-
pany.'
While the Marsh decision has never been seriously attacked by
the Court in later opinions, the Court has experienced a number of
See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 33 (1954).
2 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
3 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
1 Id. at 506-07.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
conceptual difficulties in extending it to encompass similar eco-
nomic institutions which have emerged over the -past quarter cen-
tury. In response to the modem shopping mall and the migrant
labor camp, some courts have analogized their characteristics to
Marsh, either in form or in function, to uphold the assertion of first
amendment rights against the private owner. In one shopping center
situation the Supreme Court found the center's use by the com-
munity to be the "functional equivalent" of the Marsh business
district,5 while in two courts of appeals' decisions the residential
character of the labor camp was equated with the company town.'
Neither the shopping center nor the labor camp, however, pre-
cisely replicate the form and function of the Marsh company town.
Seizing upon these differences the courts have held in two recent
decisions that Marsh does not apply to shopping centers' or migrant
camps,' and that lacking a Marsh theory of state action, no constitu-
tional restraints can be applied against the private owners' restric-
tion of first amendment activities within their domains. As a result,
the first amendment freedoms of shopping mall users and labor
camp residents have suffered a circumscription solely because of the
private character of the forum.
The premise to be explored in this note is that by focusing upon
the rights of camp residents or mall users to receive information
(their interests as listeners), rather than upon the rights of outsiders
(speakers) to gain access to the private property, a workable stan-
dard may be developed to accommodate first amendment and prop-
erty rights. This distinction between the rights of listeners and
speakers is crucial to the search for state action, for while the Su-
preme Court has been reluctant to find a speaker-based right of
access to privately owned forums, the Marsh Court's grant of
speaker access to private property was premised upon a listener's
right to receive information.9 The Court's subsequent failure to rec-
ognize this distinction invites a discussion of how Marsh and its
state action theory can be interpreted and revitalized, not only in
the labor camp situation, but also in other access controversies such
as the "shopping center""0 and "media access"" cases.
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968).
Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975);
Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978).
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
10 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
11 E.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
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THE Marsh STATE ACTION THEORY
The notion that individual constitutional rights might be asserted
against a private party was first posed in Marsh v. Alabama." The
private party involved was Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation's
company-owned town, a Mobile, Alabama suburb called Chicka-
saw. Except for its private ownership, Chickasaw had "all the char-
acteristics of any other American town,"'" including residential
areas, a small business block and a sewage system. The dispute
arose when a Jehovah's Witness attempted to distribute religious
literature from a sidewalk in the town's business district in violation
of a strictly enforced company regulation against solicitation of any
kind within the town's limits. A deputy sheriff paid by the company
warned her that she could not distribute literature on the company's
property; when she refused to leave, she was arrested and charged
with violating Alabama's criminal trespass statute.
The Marsh opinion, written by Justice Black, reasoned that as a
municipality could not absolutely ban the distribution of religious
or political literature from its streets or public places, the mere fact
that title to Chickasaw's streets and public places lay in a private
corporation did not exempt it from the rule." The Court, however,
failed to explain upon what precise basis it had found sufficient
state action to trigger the protection of the first amendment against
a private corporation.'" Two possible theories of state involvement
can be discerned from the opinion: that state action occurred
through Alabama's enforcement of a criminal trespass statute in a
private trespass action, or that state action occurred through Ala-
bama's delegation of an essentially state function, the regulation
and control of a community, to a private entity.'" The former prem-
ise appears to go too far, as it could conceivably be used to find state
action in practically any state enforcement of private interests, and
has not been accepted by the courts in recent years." The latter
theory, however, bears a closer look.
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
12 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
' Id. at 502.
" Id. at 507-08.
' See Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment
Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REv. 433, 436 (1977).
, Id. at 435-36.
" Id. at 444-51.
1979]
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The Court created the possibility that state action can arise
through private assumption of a customarily state function in what
has since become the most often cited statement from Marsh:
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public
in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.""8 The Court
analogized this situation to privately owned bridges, ferries, turn-
pikes and railroads, which, although privately owned, are subject to
a degree of state regulation as they are operated primarily to benefit
the public and thus serve an essentially "public function." Simi-
larly, the operation of an entire community might be viewed as a
peculiarly "public function" which would require the owner to in-
sure that certain rights of its users are not abridged.
Although, as Justice Reed emphasized in dissent, the Court cer-
tainly did not mean that the owners of private ferries or other public
utilities must allow their property to be used for first amendment
purposes, 9 the Court's holding does imply that when a traditionally
public forum or other area historically subject to first amendment
uses is privately controlled, the public's interest in such a use will
override any conflicting private property rights.
The most striking aspect of the Court's opinion is its great concern
for the first amendment rights of the listener. Although the case
reached the Court through the efforts of a speaker to gain access to
a privately owned forum, the Court directed its analysis to the right
of the community to receive information. No mention was made of
the plaintiff's rights of free speech or religion, but rather the Court
emphasized that "the preservation of a free society" depended upon
the right of each citizen to receive such literature as he might de-
sire,2 and that the public interest lay in structuring the community
so that "the channels of communication remain free."'"
,1 326 U.S. at 506.
" Id. at 514.
Id. at 505.
22 Id. at 507. The Court appeared to define a broad constitutional right to be informed when
it stated:
Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. These people,
just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country.
Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of
community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order
to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored.
There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these




Despite the numerous potential ramifications of the Court's ex-
tension of the first amendment to an application against a private
party, Marsh lay dormant for many years,22 owing perhaps to uncer-
tainty over exactly when it might apply. Twenty-three years later,
however, Marsh was resurrected and considerably extended by the
Court, in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,2
to encompass peaceful picketing of a privately owned suburban
shopping center.
Logan Valley involved a newly constructed shopping center which
contained only two stores at the time the dispute arose. One of the
stores employed nonunion labor and was picketed by a local food
handlers' union. The owners of the store obtained an injunction
preventing the union from further picketing, on the ground that it
constituted a trespass on private property. The union responded
that it had a first amendment right to picket despite the private
character of the forum.
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, first established that
picketing was a right protected by the first amendment, 2 although
he conceded that it might be restricted in a manner not constitu-
tionally permissible for pure speech." Then, starting from the same
premise as had the Marsh Court, the opinion noted that if the shop-
ping center premises had been part of a municipal business district,
"which they to a large extent resemble,"" rather than being pri-
vately owned, the picketers could not summarily be barred from the
exercise of their first amendment rights. The Court compared the
Logan Valley Mall with the business block in Chickasaw,2 found
the similarities between them "striking," both in terms of public
access and function, and concluded that "[t]he shopping center
here is clearly the functional equivalent to the business district: . .
in Marsh. ' On that basis the plaintiffs were allowed a first amend-
ment right to picket on private property.
As the majority read Marsh, the precise issue decided had been
whether the plaintiff had a first amendment right to distribute leaf-
lets only in the business district of Chickasaw, since no showing had
been made that such distribution would have been forbidden in the
town's residential areas. This characterization allowed the Court to
"1 O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. Rlv. 209, 222-23
(1973); Schauer, supra note 15, at 436-37.
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
2 Id. at 313.
"'Id.
" Id. at 315.
2See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
1 391 U.S. at 317.
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disregard the fact that in Marsh the company could totally bar
informational access to the community served by the business dis-
trict, while the mall owner in Logan Valley had no comparable
power over his community's residential areas. 9 The peculiar first
amendment focus of Marsh, the emphasis on the rights of residents
to receive information, was not addressed. Nor did the Court specify
in what manner the necessary state action had occurred, assuming
rather that Marsh had settled the issue and that a finding of func-
tional equivalence to Marsh would in itself show the necessary state
action.30
Perhaps in deference to Justice Black's sharp dissent, and his
position as author of Marsh, the Logan Valley Court expressly lim-
ited its holding to the facts then before it: picketing directed specifi-
cally to the patrons and operation of the picketed establishment.
Justice Black emphasized in dissent that the Marsh decision rested
on the finding that Chickasaw had all the attributes of a town,
rather than just a business district, and that Logan Valley "sounds
like a very strange 'town' to me."'" He did not, however, emphasize
his earlier concern in Marsh with the community's right to receive
information, nor did he otherwise elucidate any distinction of con-
stitutional dimension between the Marsh town and Logan Valley
business district.
Four years later the Court had another chance to explicate Marsh
and decide the issue reserved in Logan Valley: the right of a pri-
vately owned shopping center to prohibit first amendment activities
unrelated to the center's specific operations. In Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner,3" plaintiffs had attempted to distribute handbills protesting
the Vietnam War within the Lloyd Center Mall. The mall enforced
a general policy against handbilling within its premises and threat-
ened the leafletters with arrest.3 The plaintiffs sought an injunction
to restrain enforcement of the policy against handbilling.
The Supreme Court ruled against the protestors and limited
Logan Valley to its narrowest possible construction. Justice Black's
reading of Marsh, as explicated in his Logan Valley dissent, was
much quoted from and virtually adopted by the majority. It dis-
missed the Logan Valley language construing a shopping mall as the
functional equivalent of a business district as a misinterpretation of
SId.
See Schauer, supra note 15, at 438.
31 391 U.S. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting).
32 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
33 Id. at 556. Distribution of handbills or leaflets is Within the scope of the first amendment.
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
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Marsh and "unnecessary to the decision."'" The Court then seized
upon the factual limitations expressed in Logan Valley, that the
picketing was directly related to a use of the mall and no alternative
means of access existed to the desired audience," and denominated
those limitations a constitutional standard. The protestors' asserted
right of access was rejected on the grounds that the protest was not
directly related to a use of the mall, and because plaintiffs failed to
show that no alternative means of communication existed to present
their message to the mall users. 6
The Court's determination that a shopping mall was not the func-
tional equivalent of the Marsh company town completely removed
any theory of a state action foundation to support the Court's appli-
cation of first amendment rights against the private owner. More-
over, the "related use" and "alternative means" limitations ex-
pressed in Lloyd-the so-called "Lloyd test"- had no foundation
in Marsh; indeed, the Marsh plaintiff could not have met its re-
quirements," nor was it related to any theory of state action. As a
result, lower courts mechanically applied the Lloyd test in first
amendment access cases, losing sight of the necessity of finding
state action. 8
From the viewpoint of the listeners' interests emphasized in
Marsh, however, the Lloyd court did show, at least implicitly, a
concern for listeners which had been absent in Logan Valley. The
Lloyd majority's promulgation of the "alternative means" test nec-
essarily focused upon the interests of listeners. 9 One major justifica-
407 U.S. at 562.
See id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
In Marsh, the communication at issue involved the distribution of religious literature, a
use totally unrelated to the Chickasaw business district, and no showing was made that this
literature could not have been distributed elsewhere to Chickasaw residents. Justice Reed,
in his dissent, noted that the Marsh plaintiff could have distributed her literature from a
public highway "a few feet from the spot she insisted upon using." 326 U.S. at 514 (Reed, J.,
dissenting).
31 See Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73, 82 (5th Cir. 1973); Asociacion de
Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130, 137 (3d Cir. 1975).
3' Marshall, dissenting, continued to focus upon the speakers' right of access:
For many persons who do not have easy access to television, radio, the major
newspapers, and other forms of mass media, the only way they can express
themselves to a broad range of citizens on issues of general public concern is to
picket, or to handbill, or to utilize other free or relatively inexpensive means of
communication. The only hope that these people have to be able to communi-
cate effectively is to be permitted to speak in those areas in which most of their
fellow citizens can be found. One such area is the business district of a city or
town or its functional equivalent. And this is why respondents have a tremen-
dous need to express themselves within Lloyd Center.
407 U.S. at 580-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1979]
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tion for the refusal to grant the leafletters a right of access to the
mall was that their message was directed to all members of the
public, not just mall patrons, and that these listeners could presum-
ably be reached in other public places."0 By continuing to allow
access in those situations in which the mall owner could most effec-
tively preclude the receipt of information, Lloyd remained, as Jus-
tice Marshall later noted, "responsive in its own way to the concerns
underlying Marsh."4 As would soon become apparent, however, the
Lloyd rationale had little foundation in first amendment law.
The final blow to Logan Valley and its Lloyd explication came a
short time later when the Court reconsidered Marsh and its shop-
ping center analogues in Hudgens v. NLRB.12 The Hudgens dispute
arose when union warehouse employees went on strike to protest
their employer's refusal to accede to contract demands. The em-
ployeeg picketed not only the warehouse, but their employer's nine
retail outlets in the area as well. At one location, the general man-
ager of a shopping center informed the picketers that they would not
be allowed to picket within the mall premises and threatened them
with arrest if they did not depart. Their union subsequently filed an
unfair labor practices charge with the NLRB against the mall
owner, alleging both statutory and first amendment violations.43
The Supreme Court determined that the case presented a purely
statutory question under the National Labor Relations Act" and
directed the court of appeals to remand the case to the NLRB. 5 The
Court's opinion, by Justice Stewart, concluded that even the lim-
ited right of access to private property reserved in Lloyd need not
be granted as "under the present state of the law the constitutional
guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as
this.""
The conclusion that the first amendment was inapplicable "in a
case such as this" apparently refers to the Court's inability to dis-
cern state action in the ownership or control of a shopping mall.
Hudgens simply points out what should have been obvious in Lloyd,
that once a finding that a mall is the functional equivalent of a
company town is removed, the entire shopping center line of cases
must fall for lack of state action support. 7
40 Id. at 564.
" Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 540 (1976)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
11 Id. at 509-10.
11 Id. at 521.
" Id. at 523.
4 Id. at 521.
41 The Hudgens decision has been roundly attacked, both as unreasonably restricting
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Two basic conclusions may be drawn from Hudgens' rejection of
Logan Valley. First, although a Marsh company town is never pre-
cisely defined (indeed, Lloyd refers to the "company town" as an
anachronism") the modem shopping mall is clearly not its func-
tional equivalent. Second, lacking the easy state action tie of func-
tional equivalence to Marsh, insufficient state action exists in the
ownership or control of a mall to trigger a potential speaker's first
amendment rights against the mall owner. Neither conclusion is
dispositive of whether the migrant labor camp may now be defined
as the equivalent, functional or otherwise, of Marsh, or whether
sufficient state action exists in the ownership or control of a camp
to trigger the application of the first amendment. The central ques-
tion remains: precisely how did Gulf's maintenance and control of
Chickasaw constitute state action? Given the vague parameters of
Marsh, it is not surprising that in trying to answer this question the
courts have generated inconsistent results.
LABOR CAMP CASES: THE COMPANY TowN ANALOGY
In an effort to avoid disruption and discourage unionization,49
many employers of migrants prohibit access to their isolated camps
through the strict enforcement of "No Trespassing" regulations.
While a variety of rationales have been accepted by the courts to
support a right of access to privately owned migrant camps,50 most
speech rights in a modem environment and for failing to provide an adequate analysis for its
summary rejection of Lloyd and belated overrruling of Logan Valley. See generally Schauer,
supra note 15, at 441-42; Note, Shopping Center Picketing: The Impact of Hudgens v. NLRB,
45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 812, 838 (1977).
Evidence of judicial dissatisfaction with Hudgens is most apparent in the recent California
Supreme Court decision in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341 (1979). Robins replicated the Lloyd situation: plaintiffs sought an
injunction to prevent a mall owner from enforcing regulations against the use of its premises
for petition drives. The court upheld the plaintiffs' speech rights, despite the contrary holding
in Lloyd, by relying on the assertedly "more definitive and inclusive" state constitutional
guarantees of free speech. Id. at 908, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859, 592 P.2d at 346. The court stressed
the evidence of a continuing erosion of central business districts and reciprocal increased
reliance on privately owned suburban centers. Id. at 907, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858, 592 P.2d at
345.
a 407 U.S. at 558.
"See generally J. LONDON & H. ANDERON, So SHALL YE Rmp (1971).
SO Generally, four separate lines of reasoning have been identified: (1) rights of tenancy;
(2) the tort doctrine that necessity justifies trespass in some circumstances; (3) that migrant
camps are "company towns" under Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); (4) a balancing
of interests test under Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See Note, Access to
Migrant Labor Camps: Marsh v. Alabama Revisited, 55 CH.-KENT L. REv. 285, 291-96 (1979);
Note, First Amendment and the Problem of Access to Migrant Labor Camps After Lloyd
1979]
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recent decisions, including the three which have reached the federal
appellate level,5' have analogized the camps to the Marsh company
town. In drawing this analogy, however, the courts have focused
upon the rights of speakers to gain access to the camps rather than
upon the interests of the residents themselves in receiving informa-
tion. A brief review of these cases spotlights the fatal deficiency of
such an analysis.
The first case to reach the federal appellate level, Petersen v.
Talisman Sugar Corp.,12 involved a class action brought by repre-
sentatives of the United Farm Workers seeking access to the approx-
imately 1,000 workers living on the Talisman plantation.13 After
rejecting plaintiffs' claims of a statutory right of access, 4 the court
turned to the constitutional issue:5 whether the necessary state ac-
tion existed to support a first amendment claim of access. After a
detailed comparison of the facilities of the Talisman camp with the
Marsh company town, 6 the court determined that the camp was
more like a "company town" than either of the shopping centers
which were subjected to first amendment restraints on the theory
that they performed the traditional functions of government; 7 then,
Corporation v. Tanner, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 560-61 (1976); Note, Toward a Constitutional
Right of Access to Migrant Labor Camps, 29 RUTGERs L. REv. 972, 981-84 (1976).
" Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978); Asociacion
de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975); Petersen v.
Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
52 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
" The Talisman camp contained housing for its workers, kitchen and recreational facilities,
a camp laundry, a store, and also performed such typically municipal functions as fire protec-
tion, sewage disposal, garbage collection and postal service. In addition, the camp was totally
isolated from local communities, situated eight miles from the nearest highway and twenty-
five miles from the closest town. Id. at 76.
" Plaintiffs claimed a statutory right of access under the Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. §§
1100-1161 (1976), and the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49(b)(1976). The Sugar Act pro-
vides for payments by the Secretary of Agriculture to sugar producers, conditioned upon their
meeting certain employment standards. The Wagner-Peyser Act establishes an interstate
system for the recruitment and transfer of labor.
" In considering the constitutional question the court noted that although the district court
had dismissed the action, in part due to its belief that plaintiffs could not assert the rights
of migrants to receive information, it had not considered plaintiffs' own rights to disseminate
information. The court reached no conclusion as to plaintiffs' standing to assert the migrants'
rights, but did hold that plaintiffs had standing to assert their own right of access to speak
to the camp residents. 478 F.2d at 80-81.
' See note 53 supra.
'7 478 F.2d at 82. As the court explained later in its opinion:
By using its property as a round-the-clock habitat for its employees, Talisman
has forfeited the broad right which the owner of sawgrass and marshes alone
would have to enforce strictly a "No Trespassers" policy. Having located the
functional equivalent of a thousand-resident municipality in the midst of its
property, the company must accommodate its property rights to the extent
[Vol. 55:91
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without further analysis, the court stated that, "[t]he threshold
question of state action [is] satisfied. 5 8
The reference to "shopping centers" was, of course, an allusion to
Lloyd and Logan Valley. The Talisman court applied the Lloyd
formula to its labor camp facts and concluded .that a right of access
must be granted because there was no alternative means of commu-
nication to the workers on public property, and because such com-
munication was related to the use to which Talisman had put its
property." The court then concluded that Talisman "must accom-
modate its property rights to the extent necessary to allow the free
flow of ideas and information between the plaintiffs and the mi-
grants. 6
0
The second appellate decision, Asociacion de Trabajadores Agri-
colas v. Green Giant Co.,6" again involved a class action seeking a
speaker-based right of access to a labor camp." The Third Circuit's
approach differed slightly from that of the Talisman court, although
it also relied heavily upon Lloyd and Logan Valley. The court read
the shopping center analogies as holding that where a facility was
"indistinguishable" from a town it was obligated to assume the full
first amendment burdens of a municipality, but that "[w]here the
private enterprise has some, but fewer than all, of the attributes
normally associated with a community, a composite set of facts,
tested under the formula of Lloyd, might warrant an accommoda-
tion of property rights so as to allow a circumscribed access to the
property and the exercise of freedom of expression. 6 3 No prelimi-
nary determination of state action was required; rather, a
"multifaceted inquiry" was employed, focusing on the characteris-
tics of the property, the availability of alternative means of commu-
nication, and whether the expression was related to the use of the
property. This resulted in a sliding scale determination of state




Actually, the "Lloyd test," as it is referred to by most lower courts, is simply the Lloyd
restatement of the facts in Logan Valley, that is, the expressed limitation in Logan Valley
that the picketing approved therein was related to the use to which the facility was being
put (the "related use" test), and that no alternative means of access existed to the group with
whom the picketers desired to communicate (the "alternative means" test).
" 478 F.2d at 83.
" 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975).
"The Green Giant camp housed some 900 Puerto Rican migrants, and contained basic
dormitory housing, recreational facilities, an eating hall, a first aid station and a company
store. Id. at 133.
0 Id. at 137.
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action whereby "[1limited First Amendment rights may be held
enforceable where limited public functions are performed." 4
Applying this test, the court determined that although the Green
Giant camp "presents features akin to the company town in
Marsh," it could not be considered "indistinguishable" from a town
as it lacked a sufficient degree of public openness.A" Accordingly, the
Lloyd "multifaceted inquiry" was applied to determine whether the
camp might be required to accommodate "limited" first amend-
ment activity. Although satisfied that the message plaintiffs sought
to communicate to camp residents was related to the use of the
camp, the court was not convinced that there were no alternative
means of communication to the camp residents."8 The court con-
ceded the likelihood that such access was indeed unavailable, and
even cited Talisman and three labor camp cases at the district court
level where such a showing had been made, 7 but refused to take
judicial notice of the workers' isolation. Since plaintiffs failed to
come wholly within Marsh, and had not presented sufficient evi-
dence to meet the narrower standard demanded by Lloyd, the judg-
ment of the district court denying their request for a preliminary
injunction was affirmed.
Both the Talisman and Green Giant decisions failed to articulate
a concrete theory of state action to support the enforcement of first
amendment duties. Neither decision entirely ignores the state ac-
tion requirement," yet neither delineates a precise basis upon which
the maintenance of a labor camp constitutes state action. Both
assumed that if the labor camp could be analogized to Marsh, or
even to the second generation shopping center analogues, then
Marsh, or perhaps Lloyd, would supply the necessary state action.
As later cases would hold," such a reliance on the Supreme Court's
64 Id.
See id. at 138.
6 Plaintiffs had not anticipated the necessity of making such a showing since they had
sought to come wholly within Marsh, and had thus presented no evidence on this point. See
id. at 139-40.
"1 Id. at 140 (citing Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1973)); Valez
v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833
(S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
Talisman recognized the necessity for state action but defined it only by stating, "[o]ur
inquiry, therefore must be directed at whether or not Talisman Sugar Corporation occupies
the shoes of the state vis-a-vis. . . these workers and the plaintiffs who seek access to them."
478 F.2d at 81. Green Giant made a similarly broad generalization, stating that, "before a
servitude of First Amendment freedoms may be imposed on privately held property, that
property must be invested to some degree with the physical or functional attributes of public
use." 518 F.2d at 136.
" Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co.,
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own muddy analysis of state action in Logan Valley and Lloyd, was
not justified.
Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co. (Campbell II),70 a
Seventh Circuit case, was the first reported decision to deny a
speaker access to a migrant camp. Plaintiff, a not-for-profit Illinois
corporation, had sought access to some 150 migrants and farmwork-
ers who were employed and resided year-round on defendant's
mushroom farm. Plaintiffs had based their access claim on both
constitutional and statutory grounds but were dismissed at the dis-
trict court level pursuant to a finding that the company's refusal to
allow plaintiffs access to the camp lacked the necessary state action
to give the court jurisdiction.
On its first hearing of Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup
Co. (Campbell I),7" the Seventh Circuit had reversed the district
court, finding that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to show that
the labor camp might constitute a Marsh company town, and that
the company had thus acted "under color of state law" when it
denied plaintiffs access to the camp. 2 The court eschewed any com-
parison with the shopping center analogies of Lloyd and Logan
Valley, noting that, in contrast to a shopping center, a migrant
camp was a residential community and could thus be directly com-
pared to Marsh.73 If the Prince Crossing camp could be shown to be
the "functional equivalent of a municipality," then the plaintiffs'
first amendment rights could not be subjected to the balancing test
outlined in Lloyd.7
Not surprisingly, in view of the circuit court's "encouraging"
opinion, 5 the district court found on remand that Prince Crossing
574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978); see notes 15 & 47 supra. See also notes 70-83 & accompanying
text infra.
0 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978).
71 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975).
72 Id. at 395.
" Id. at 396.
7' Id. The court seized upon the objection to the Lloyd balancing test which the Hudgens
Court ultimately used to reject Lloyd: "If Prince Crossing is the functional equivalent of a
municipality, it may not restrict the plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights save
for such reasonable and limited regulations permitted any other town. The plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights cannot be balanced away in the manner suggested by the district court."
Id. The Hudgens Court had stated: "if a large self-contained shopping center is the functional
equivalent of a municipality, as Logan Valley held, then the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments would not permit control of speech within such a center to depend upon the speech's
content." 424 U.S. at 520.
75 In Campbell II, 574 F.2d 374, Judge Sprecher defended the district court decision:
The district court's conclusion that Prince Crossing is a company town within
the meaning of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), was encouraged by our
earlier opinion upon the first appeal of this case, 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975),
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was indeed a "company town," and thus "when defendant acted
through its agents to prevent plaintiffs from exercising their first
amendment freedoms within the farm, it did so under color of state
law."7 The decision was again appealed, and in Campbell H, the
Seventh Circuit again reversed, drawing several rather attenuated
factual distinctions between Chickasaw and Prince Crossing to con-
clude that Prince Crossing did not constitute a company town and
the defendant's refusal to allow plaintiffs access to its property thus
entailed -no constitutional violation. 77
In reaching this conclusion the court summarized Marsh as hold-
ing that "whenever private property includes all the components of
a town, it becomes sufficiently state-like to fulfill the state-action
requirement for invoking First Amendment rights. 78 It added that
"[d]etermining the threshold of components necessary to consti-
tute a company town under Marsh requires a detailed factual analy-
sis. '" The court made such an analysis and found that although the
Prince Crossing owner provided sewage disposal, garbage collection
and water supply, all "relevant indicia of a company town," 0 the
lack of fire and police protection, and of a significant shopping
district,8 ' compelled its conclusion that Prince Crossing was not
sufficiently "state-like" to fulfill "state-action" requirements.
Despite the Campbell II disclaimer that it examined the shopping
center cases for "legal background purposes" only and that they "do
not alter the doctrine as applied in the case before us,' 8 2 the influ-
ence of the Supreme Court's decision in Hudgens undoubtedly
loomed large. Conscious of the Supreme Court's rejection of the
"company town" analogy in the modern shopping center, the Sev-
enth Circuit apparently concluded that it would be on similarly
shaky ground in extending the correlation to labor camps. Rare
which, in turn, was encouraged by Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968). Because Logan Valley was 'interred' if not overruled by
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), I must concur in Judge Pell's opinion
but if Hudgens had not intervened I would take the position Judge Leighton
took in the district court ....
574 F.2d at 379 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
11 438 F. Supp. 222, 227 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
7 574 F.2d at 378.
,1 Id. at 376.
79 Id.
1* Id. at 378.
1, The lack of a "shopping district" is an especially spurious distinction since the business
district in Marsh itself consisted of one building. Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise
of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEo. L. REv. 1187, 1216 (1973).
u 574 F.2d at 376. The court emphasized that "it is the Marsh doctrine, unscathed by
Logan Valley and Lloyd, and reaffirmed by Hudgens, that we now will apply." Id.
[Vol. 55:91
LISTENERS' RIGHTS
indeed will be the labor camp now able to withstand the Campbell
11 "detailed factual analysis" and show complete replication of the
facilities necessary to constitute a town.8 3
Clearly, Campbell II casts serious doubt upon the continued via-
bility of the "company town" labor camp line of cases. Whether
premised on an understanding that the Lloyd test constituted a tool
to apply Marsh, or that Lloyd created a more limited version of
Marsh first amendment servitudes, the Talisman and Green Giant
decisions had depended on an application of the Lloyd test to sup-
port an access right. Following Hudgens, the Campbell II decision
correctly noted that the migrant camp cases must now meet the
cloudy criteria of Marsh alone.
Two major problems with a speaker-based right of access to pri-
vately owned labor camps are thus apparent. First, the courts have
failed to articulate clearly a theory of state action in the private
maintenance of such camps, a failure most apparent in the
Campbell II rejection of a state action claim. While the Campbell
II focus on a point-by-point comparison of the number of municipal
services performed by the private owner trivializes Marsh,4 it does
emphasize the failure of the earlier decisions to define state action.
Its interpretation reveals their common misconception of Marsh:
that an arcane number of typically municipal functions undertaken
upon private property would somehow transmute that property into
a "public forum" if Marsh were suitably invoked.
The remaining obstacle is that even if Marsh can be somehow
relied upon to supply a state action theory, no satisfactory definition
of a "company town" has been developed which might define a
modern parallel. By returning to Marsh, as Hudgens and Campbell
II demand, and focusing upon the first amendment rights of camp
residents to receive information, a Marsh-based theory of state ac-
Indeed, in comparing the court's description of the Campbell H town with those of
Marsh, Talisman and Green Giant it is hard to see any significant differences. Of the five
criteria which Campbell I examines as constituting a company town there appear few, if any,
differences among the facts of the cases: (1) all four contain a residential area; (2) apparently
none provide their own fire department; (3) Campbell II had police protection supplied by
the county sheriff, while the Marsh and Green Giant owners paid a deputy and state trooper
respectively for special protection; (4) none provided a "shopping district" although each had
at least a small store where a limited number of necessities could be purchased; and (5) all
provided a degree of sewage, garbage and water service.
" See Note, Access to Migrant Labor Camps: Marsh v. Alabama Revisited, 55 CM.-KEr
L. Rav. 285, 300 (1979), where it was remarked that "in failing to appreciate the interrela-
tionship between privately supplied municipal services and first amendment expressive
rights, the Seventh Circuit's analysis resulted in a formalistic rather than a substantive
interpretation of the company town doctrine."
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tion can be articulated and a viable modern analogue to the com-
pany town can be-defined.
THE RIGHT TO LISTEN
That individual citizens have a basic right to receive information
is not a recent idea; indeed, commentators have found support in
the writing of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson for the view
that the very process of self-government requires that its partici-
pants have free access to a vital "flow of information."8 5 Justice
Brandeis brought to life the rationale for such a right when he ob-
served in Whitney v. California,8"
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be fu-
tile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate pro-
tection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
great menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American govenment 7
This reciprocal character of first amendment speech between speak-
ing and listening has been often noted by the Court. In Martin v.
City of Struthers" the Court stated, "this freedom [of speech]
embraces the right to receive literature. . . and necessarily protects
the right to receive it."8 Similarly, in Lamont v. Postmaster
General Justice Brennan reasoned: "The dissemination of ideas
can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free
to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." 9' Beyond defining the
13 See O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 209, 220-
23 (1973); Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J.
209 (1952). O'Neil quotes from a letter of James Madison: "Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy, or, perhaps both." And similarly,
from a letter of Thomas Jefferson: "The basis of our government's being the opinion of the
people, the very first object should be to keep that right. The way to prevent [errors of] the
people, is to give them full information of their affairs through the channels of the public
papers, and to contrive that these papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people."
O'Neil, supra, at 220-21.
88 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
17 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
" Id. at 143.
381 U.S. 301 (1965).




reciprocal character of first amendment speech, the Court's focus
upon a participatory democracy rationale for the first amendment 2
has vested listeners' interests with an increasing amount of force in
recent years. The Court has recognized the listeners' rights of the
consumer to receive commercial information. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,9 3
consumers of prescription drugs were allowed to assert their first
amendment rights in the "free flow" of commercial information
against a state agency's prohibition of the dissemination of any drug
price information. On an identical basis, attorneys have now been
granted a first amendment right to advertise. 4 In Linmark Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro95 the Court relied upon a
community's interest in the receipt of commercial information to
overturn a local ordinance barring the erection of "For Sale" signs.
Additionally, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti96 the
Court upheld the right of a corporation to make expenditures to
influence a referendum, on the basis of the public's need to be
informed. The Court noted, in reference to its recent commercial
speech cases (Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Linmark), that,
"they illustrate that the First Amendment goes beyond protection
of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit govern-
ment from limiting the stock of information from which members
of the public may draw." 7
In addition to the recent cases which have recognized a right to
receive information and then balanced that right against non-first
amendment interests, another line of cases, the "media access" de-
cisions,"5 have balanced the first amendment rights of listeners di-
The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two
sides of the same coin. But the coin itself is the process of thought and discus-
sion. The activity of speakers becoming listeners and listeners becoming speak-
ers in the vital interchange of thought is the "means indispensable to the discov-
ery and spread of political truth.". . .The First Amendment means that Gov-
ernment has no power to thwart the process of free discussion, to "abridge" the
freedoms necessary to make that process work.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775-76 (1972)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
" See notes 88-90 & accompanying text supra. However, such a reading of the first amend-
ment is not universally accepted. Justice White, in his dissent in First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978), cited a far different first amendment rationale, noting,
"what some have considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of
communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization and self-fulfillment ... "
,3 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
, Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
431 U.S. 85 (1977).
" 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
I !d. at 783.
" See generally O'Neil, supra note 85, at 229-33.
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rectly against those of speakers, and have uniformly found the bal-
ance tilted in favor of the listeners. While much of the rationale for
these decisions must be attributed to the highly regulated nature of
the broadcast media and the finite capacity of the airwaves, they
are still useful in defining the extent of listener interests.
In the first of these decisions, Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 9 the
Court rejected a broadcasters' challenge to FCC regulations which
mandated a right of reply to any individual who had been the object
of a "personal attack" over a broadcast station. In upholding that
regulation, the Court also approved the traditional FCC Fairness
Doctrine under which "broadcasters are responsible for providing
the listening and viewing public with access to a balanced presenta-
tion of information on issues of public importance." ' In denying
the broadcasters' claims that such a regulation abridged their first
amendment freedom of speech the Court once again focused on the
rights of listeners. After noting that the airwaves were a finite re-
source to which every speaker could not practically obtain access,
the Court emphasized:
it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount .... It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to coun-
tenance monopolization of.that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee . . . .It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Con-
gress or by the FCC. 0'
The Court went on to express the view that the Fairness Doctrine
not only was constitutional, but that it served to further the first
amendment interests of listeners, although concededly at the ex-
pense of potential speakers. 02
The Court continued to support the underlying rationale of the
Fairness Doctrine in CBS v. Democratic National Committee. 0 3 In
CBS the Court rejected the challenges of the Democratic National
Committee to certain broadcasters' policies of flatly refusing all
editorial advertisements. The Court again focused upon the inter-
ests of listeners and held that they were adequately served by the
" 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
412 U.S. 94, 112 (1973).
to' 395 U.S. at 390.
,o2 Id. at 391.
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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Fairness Doctrine. Having determined that the public's right to be
informed had not been abridged,1 4 the majority urged that it would
be "anomalous" to subject broadcasters to government regulations
mandating access to groups wishing to dissemiiate editorial state-
ments "in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees of
free expression."" 5 In the Court's view, as long as the interests of
listeners were adequately served, the first amendment required that
government regulation over the broadcast media be kept to a mini-
mum, even though it may deny paid-speaker-access to what is argu-
ably society's most pervasive forum. Finally, in FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting' the Court upheld FCC regu-
lations drafted to enhance diversity of information by barring com-
mon ownership of a radio or television station and a daily newspaper
in the same community.
This brief survey suggests that in recent years listeners' rights
have moved out of the shadow of speakers' rights to assume a pri-
mary constitutional role. While the advertising and media access
cases provide a broad basis on which migrant camp residents or mall
patrons might assert their own interests in receiving access to out-
side information, the private owners' denial of this access right must
still be shown to constitute state action. The courts have generally
relied upon Marsh to supply this necessary tie to the state.
STATE ACTION BASED ON LISTENERS' RIGHTS
Listeners' Rights
In order to properly apply Marsh's unique state action theory
judicial analysis should concentrate on the rights of the community
in the receipt of information, rather than on the rights of those
claiming access to the private property. The town in Marsh differed
most significantly from the shopping malls of Logan Valley, Lloyd
and Hudgens in that the private owner of Chickasaw could control
the flow of information to its community's residents, while the pri-
vate mall owners lacked such control over their communities. In
rejecting the shopping center cases, while preserving Marsh, the
Court leaves the implication that before it will find the crucial ele-
ment of state action, the private owner must have this ability to
control or foreclose the community's receipt of information.
I" Id. at 102.
Id. at 120.
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
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In his Hudgens dissent, Justice Marshall recognized the concern
that the community retain free access to information: "The under-
lying concern in Marsh was that the traditional public channels of
communication remain free, regardless of the incidence of owner-
ship." 107 He conceded that the mall owner controlled only a
"portion" of the community's first amendment forums.'0' The prob-
lem with his position, and Lloyd, lies in the grant of first amend-
ment rights only when the speech at issue is related to a use of the
mall-the content-based analysis which the Hudgens majority
found so constitutionally objectionable.' In addition, this view
draws an untenable distinction between the store located in a shop-
ping center, which would have to allow a limited right of speaker
access, while the "free-standing" store would remain concededly
immune. 10 By focusing upon speaker access in this manner, Mar-
shall lost the essential connection he first discerned between Logan
Valley and Marsh: the similar functions of a traditional business
district and modern shopping mall in providing information to a
community.
While Hudgens unquestionably restricts the opportunities for a
speaker to gain easy access to a portion of the community, the
decision can be justified not only as recognizing but also as better
serving the rights of listeners by insuring that diverse viewpoints
continue to be presented before the community. Both Hudgens and
CBS reflect a concern that any governmentally mandated right of
access to a privately owned forum might ultimately stifle diversity
of opinion or "vigorous debate" by compelling the use of private
resources to promulgate the opinions of other members of the pub-
lic. In CBS the Court also noted that any enforcement of a govern-
mentally demanded right of access to broadcasting or newspapers
would involve the government in basic editorial decisions tradition-
ally reserved to the media. Similarly, should the government man-
date a right of access to privately owned "public forums" such as
shopping malls, it would face the difficult administrative task of
regulating such access to insure that a balanced, fair, or diverse
smorgasboard of opinion is presented. In addition, the private prop-
erty owner might well prefer to foreclose the use of his forum to all
groups for noncommercial activity, rather than allow the presenta-
107 424 U.S. at 539 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1o Id. at 540-41.
00, Id. at 520 (majority opinion).
,,0 See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972). In this decision, handed
down the same day as Lloyd, the Court reasoned that a parking lot which served a single store
did not assume the "public function" attributes of a shopping center.
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tion on his property of viewpoints with which he disagrees."'
Ideally, the first amendment's proscription of government in-
volvement in communication should encourage citizen participation
in vigorous public debate by allowing private parties to use their
own resources in support of personal viewpoints or philosophies."12
Private parties have no governmentally compelled obligation under
the first amendment to be "fair" or present all sides of an issue, but
are free to present personal views, leaving any resolution of the
"true" or "best" idea to public opinion.1 3 Thus in both CBS and
Hudgens, the Court decided that diversity of opinion might best be
presented to listeners by leaving the task to private resources. The
Court's concern with diversity of opinion, rather than speaker ac-
cess, is aptly illustrated by the approval of the Fairness Doctrine in
Red Lion and the quotation in CBS of Professor Alexander Meikle-
john's aphorism: "What is essential is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said.""' In this area the
Court's focus has been upon a listener's interest in the receipt of
Administration of a right of access to private property such as a shopping center,
designed as a marketplace for goods and services, not ideas, would create
similar difficulties. How could a court, for example, determine if a fair sampling
of community opinion were offered within the limits of available time and
space? More important, how could a court make such a determination without
considering the content of speech, an inquiry heretofore forbidden by the first
amendment? Alternatively if the property owners were required to allow bal-
anced use of the forum if any use were allowed, the result would probably be
closing the facilities to all groups and a loss to the community. Every reasonably
imaginable consequence indicates that the sacrifice of owners' speech and prop-
erty rights would mean little enhancement of the rights of nonowners, and little
benefit to the community. In expressly overruling Logan Valley, Hudgens re-
moved the last theoretical support for an access theory and affirmed the Court's
view that the continued vitality of the free speech guarantee requires a strict
reading of state action in first amendment cases to preserve a wide sphere of
private choice.
Schauer, supra note 15, at 460 (footnotes omitted).
Empirical support for this position can be found in Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478
F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1975). After suit was initiated by the United Farm Workers for an access
right the owner invested over one million dollars in cane cutting machinery, gave up its
importation of Jamaican workers, and assured the court that it would employ no workers in
the future, id. at 78, all presumably in order to avoid a governmentally mandated right of
speaker access to the privately owned camp.
"' See Schauer, supra note 15, at 459.
" Milton enunciated such a philosophy in his Areopagitica:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth,
so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to
misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?
J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, reprinted in 32 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 409 (R.
Hutchins, ed. 1952).
"4 412 U.S. at 122.
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diverse viewpoints and not upon the speaker's access rights to pri-
vate property. This focus on diversity as "freedom of speech" effects
a delicate resolution of the conflict between private property and the
community's interest in the "free flow" of speech, by assuming that
private resources will continue to supply the community with a
broad range of opinion.
The Court, however, cannot resolve the question whether the first
amendment can best be served by securing the rights of speakers or
by insuring that all listeners have access to a diverse sampling of
opinion without first recognizing that two distinct interests are in-
volved. The failure of the Court to identify and address these often-
times conflicting interests reveals itself in the diverse and contradic-
tory opinions of the Justices in the shopping center and media ac-
cess decisions. Each opinion is premised on a furthering of "freedom
of speech," yet antithetical conclusions are reached. In response to
the majority's use in CBS of Professor Meiklejohn's statement that
it is essential that everything worth saying shall be said, Justice
Brennan, in dissent replied that "[t]he genius of the First Amend-
ment .. .is that it has always defined what the public ought to
hear by permitting speakers to say what they wish."" 5 Both state-
ments are "true"-the choice of one over the other depends on
whether one feels that free speech should be encouraged by provid-
ing listeners with access to a diversity of opinion, or by allowing each
speaker public access to privately owned forums.
State Action and the Farm Labor Camp
Accepting the premise that Hudgens and CBS reflect the increas-
ing viability of listeners' rights under the first amendment, there
remains nevertheless the limitation of the reach of the amendment
in its application to the migrant camp situation. In Marsh, the
Court found state action in the fact that the state had delegated the
responsibility for the ownership and control of a community (the
public function), to a private entity. It was the power given that
private party to deny a community access to information which
reached so far as to constitute sufficient state action for the first
amendment to come into play.
Marsh indicated that when a private individual takes on such a
basic governmental obligation as the control of a community or
group of citizens, his property rights must be diminished to the
extent necessary to protect certain basic constitutional rights of
"1 421 U.S. at 196.
(Vol. 55:91
LISTENERS' RIGHTS
those citizens, rights necessary for "good citizens" to be "properly
informed."'' Applying this reading of Marsh to the migrant camp
situation, the camp owner, by so opening his private property to
permit or require his employees to live on it, necessarily suffers a
diminishment of property rights to the extent required to accommo-
date the rights of his employees to receive information." 7 When the
camp owner assumes such a relationship to those in the privately
owned community, their first amendment rights as listeners become
applicable against the owner.
From the standpoint of those residents the owner performs the
"public function" of a normal municipality and the residents need
lose none of their basic rights as a community through the mere
status of title to the land. The community itself, as a body of people
sharing certain rights, responsibilities and interests in a common
area, does not differ in these respects from any other community."'
The importance of whether the court focuses upon the rights of
speakers or of listeners is vividly illustrated in Campbell II. If the
focus is upon the speaker, the right of access will depend upon the
status of the forum. Where the forum is privately owned, as in
Campbell I, Hudgens or CBS, courts have repeatedly declined to
mandate a right of access. If instead the focus is upon the rights of
listeners, a private owner's rights may be restricted only to the
minimal extent necessary to protect the rights of the community.
Any extension of the doctrine depends upon the needs of a com-
munity to be informed, a much stricter and more workable standard
than granting a right of access to private property whenever it is
used by the general public.
By focusing upon the rights of listeners, the most basic concern
in the migrant camp access situation can be identified."9 This con-
" 26 U.S. at 508.
11 As Marsh states, "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it." Id. at 506.
" This appears to be the thrust of Justice Frankfurter's statement in Marsh that:
A company-owned town gives rise to a net-work of property relations. As to
these, the judicial organ of a State has the final say. But a company-owned town
is a town. In its community aspects it does not differ from other towns. These
community aspects are decisive in adjusting the relations now before us, and
more particularly in adjudicating the clash of freedoms which the Bill of Rights
was designed to resolve-the freedom of the community to regulate its life and
the freedom of the individual to exercise his religion and to disseminate his
ideas. Title to property as defined by State law controls property relations; it
cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company
town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations.
Id. at 510-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"I As Chief Judge Fox eloquently stated this concern in Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp.
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cern is not that a speaker is losing an opportunity to communicate
with members of the public in an easily accessible place, as was
perhaps the primary concern in the shopping center cases, but that
migrant workers are being denied access to information which they
desperately need in order to survive in a generally hostile milieu.
The problems of camp workers can then be properly resolved in the
courts with as little interference as necessary to the camp owner's
property rights. In this regard the migrant camp would not become
a general first amendment forum to the extent of a public park or
town square, nor would the owner have to open the camp to the
public in general. The camp owner would, however, be compelled
to recognize the first amendment rights of camp residents to enjoy
access to a free flow of information.
State Action in the Shopping Mall Context
Similarly, focusing upon the rights of listeners in the shopping
center cases will restore the proper balance between free speech and
property interests while remaining responsive to the needs of a
changing society. A focus on listeners requires a factual determina-
tion of whether the interests of mall patrons in the receipt of infor-
mation is being unreasonably abridged in that specific case. In
Hudgens and Lloyd the Supreme Court implicitly made a factual
determination that mall users had access to information in other
public places. This assumption would be appropriate for many
shopping mall situations, but in some cases the facts may require a
different result. The recent California Supreme Court decision in
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 0 mandated speaker access
to a privately owned mall based on special state constitutional guar-
615, 625 (W.D. Mich. 1971):
Whether the court regards the question of access to migrant labor camps as
one of constitutional law, the rights surrounding the ownership of real property
or the rights of tenants in relation to their landlord, the law compels a single
conclusion. The fundamental underlying principle is simply the real property
ownership does not vest the owner with dominion over the lives of those people
living on his property.
The migrants who travel across the country to work in the grower's fields and
live on the grower's property are clothed with their full bundle of rights as
citizens and human beings. They may not be held in servitude or peonage, and
they are not serfs.
They are, however, citizens of the United States and tenants. As such they
are entitled to the kinds of communications, associations, and friendships guar-
anteed to all citizens, and secured by the Constitution. The owner's property
rights do not divest the migrants of these rights.
110 23 Cal. 3d 899, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341 (1979).
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antees of free speech. in so doing, the court indicated that private
restriction of free speech may have a significant effect on first
amendment rights: statistics cited in the opinion reveal the signifi-
cance of the mall in the San Jose community and document the
plaintiffs' concern that foreclosing free dissemination of information
in such a dominant community center would severely limit the com-
munity's access to information. 121 By thus focusing upon listeners,
the courts can retain a degree of flexibility in protecting first amend-
ment rights from private restrictions.
CONCLUSION
Marsh remains today one of the Supreme Court's most potentially
far-reaching decisions. Its application of the constitutional guaran-
tees of individuals against a private party generates added oppor-
tunities of application in a time when an increasing number of tradi-
tionally "public" functions are being assumed by private entities.
Its continuing viability depends to a great extent, however, upon a
clarification of the theory and scope of its application of state action
to a private party. The migrant labor camp cases present an ideal
opportunity for the Court to take a fresh look at the Marsh company
town doctrine, and to make an examination of a state action theory
in terms of listeners' interests.
This note has contended that Marsh found state action by focus-
ing upon the denial by a private party of the constitutional rights
of a community of listeners to receive information. The Lloyd,
Hudgens and Campbell H decisions were, then, doctrinally correct
in their refusal to recognize a constitutional right of speaker access
to private property. Marsh should, however, be extended to the
migrant labor camp situation, or even to the shopping mall, in those
instances where the private owner has the ability to foreclose the
community's right to receive information.
THoMAs A. CLEMENTS
2 Id. at 907, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858, 592 P.2d at 345.
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